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the power of "interpretation." The articles concerning general periodical
review like article 109 of the UN Charter have not been of much use to
facilitate amendments. Even rigid amendment rules are preferable to having
none at all, as was shown by the trouble which the absence of such rules
caused to the Permanent Court of International Justice from 1930 to 1936,
and in 1945.
In his concluding remarks the author stresses the necessity of more
intensive research into the constitutional law of international organizations.
Nevertheless, the present excellent monograph gives a wealth of very interesting information which serves well to illustrate the difficulty of more
general research. If one wants to escape being mired in detail, one can only
describe trends. It does not matter much, as the author rightly insists, that
these trends have not yet acquired the force of customary law; even if they
had, they could be set aside by any specific provision included in such a
constitutive instrument. However, if one would wish to give more precise
information, one is confronted by such a mass of rules, differing from each
other in sometimes important details, that it is very difficult to summarize
these provisions in fewer pages than the author has done. Yet, the topic
covers only a small fragment of the rules figuring in constitutive instruments of international organizations. A book which attempted to compare
in this manner all the rules in such instruments would run into several
volumes.

LAW IN INDIA
By Mr. Justice P. B.
Mukharji. Bombay: University of Bombay, 1967. Pp. x, 195.
RIGHT TO PROPERTY UNDER THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. By H. M. Jain, Allahabad, Chaitanya Publishing House, 1968. Pp. xxiv, 343.
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND AMENDMENT OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION. By S.
P. Sathe. Bombay: University of Bombay, 1968. Pp. 68.
THE CRITICAL PROBLEMS OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION.

Reviewed by Ralph F. Fuchs*
Mr. Justice Mukharji's volume on The Critical Problems of the Indian
Constitution consists of the 1966 Chimanlal Setalvad Lectures at the University of Bombay by a long-time judge of the High Court of Calcutta, now
also Dean of the Faculty of Law of the University there. The book focuses
on those constitutional issues which Mr. Justice Mukharji considers to be
most basic and timely, because success or failure of the Indian democracy
turns on them to a large extent. The author avoids the traditional lawyer's
approach of concentrating on judicial decisions. The text deals, instead, with
the Constitution itself and the uses which have been made of its provisions
politically and administratively. It covers successively the executive, legislative, and judicial powers; federalism; the unwritten aspects of constitutional
* Professor of Law, University of Indiana (at Bloomington).
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practice; and the conditions, institutions, and attitudes essential to maintaining an adequate government of limited powers in today's world.
In his introduction to the volume, Mr. Justice Mukharji stresses that the
most critical aspects of constitutional development, although they turn to
some extent on the forms and intended meanings of constitutional provisions,
depend most largely on the "national character and national psychology."
These national characteristics determine what is viable and what is ephemeral
in constitutional practice. It cannot be said, however, that the book as a
whole bears out the promise, implicit in this thought, of an analysis of
Indian culture, social needs, and constitutional response. The approach is,
rather, through the text of the Constitution, the specific meanings which
have been given to its provisions, the interrelations of its parts, and the
interpretations which, in the author's view, are required if there is to be a
successful Indian legal order, producing individual and social justice.
Mr. Justice Mukharji asserts that "[t]he Indian genius has a flair for the
absolute and the ideal and almost a congenital disregard verging on contempt for the practical and the concrete." (P. vi.) Nevertheless he does not
find that the Constitution expresses this characteristic. It is a severely detailed
and practical document. There is an absence from it of broad bestowals of
power, an avoidance of any articulated theory of federalism, and an exclusion of any adherence to stated "isms" of either the left or the right. The
author fiercely rejects the importation into Indian affairs of theories and
conceptions drawn from other constitutional systems, such as parliamentary
government in the British sense. The Constitution of India, he insists, is
what it is-the sum of many parts, sui generis, and to be interpreted to carry
out its specific purposes in a uniquely Indian context.
The most significant and effective chapter in Mr. Justice Mukharji's book
is the opening one which deals with the executive power. In it the author
argues eloquently for recognition that the President of India, far from
occupying the completely subordinate political position of the English
Crown, should exercise independently certain powers which have been
bestowed upon him. He functions over-all in relation to the Council of
Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, for which the Constitution makes
specific provision. The Council is a "government" in a parliamentary sense,
as Mr. Justice Mukharii recognizes in his chapter on "conventions" (unwritten practice) by inferring a requirement that the Prime Minister be a
member of the lower house, even though there is no explicit provision to
this effect (pp. 159-160). The President, however, has the power to refer bills
back for changes after their initial presentation to him for assent-a power
which would be meaningless in relation to bills sponsored by the "government" unless it could be exercised independently (p. 17). The method of
selecting the President is elaborately democratic in a manner that, like the
limitation of his term of office to six years, would be unnecessary if he were
to be a mere figurehead. He is not to be a member of any legislature; he
is clearly to be above political partizanship; and the oath of office he is required to take is unique in providing for his duty "to preserve, protect and
defend the Constitution and the law." Impeachment of a President, for
which the Constitution provides, would be inappropriate for an official
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who exercised no significant powers. Most particularly in a country which
is subject to many factional divisions, yet has so far been under the
dominance of a single political party, the role of the President as both a
unifying force and a safeguard against a possible "constitutional dictatorship". of the dominant party is important. The author does not say to what
extent this viewpoint can prevail, given the traditions, personalities, and
popular attitudes which have operated and remain at work. Certainly the
theory that India's government is a parliamentary one is generally accepted.'
Mr. Justice Mukharji has supplied a cogent lawyer's brief for a modified
view, rather than a social diagnosis or a forecast in support of his position.
Especially important in Mr. Justice Mukharji's remaining text are his
account of Indian federalism, his recital of the difficulties under which the
judiciary operates because of low salaries, severe provisions with respect to
retirement of judges, and inadequate correlation of the administration of
the various courts. Suspicious of administrative justice, he would subject it
more thoroughly to control by the courts than is the case at present (pp.
172-174), and is bitter in rejecting the possible use of ombudsmen to correct
deficiencies and abuses in public administration, which he regards as a
threat to judicial review (pp. 175-178). In an excursion into social diagnosis
the author expresses distaste for the Constitutional exclusion of religious
instruction from government-supported educational institutions, because
"education without religion . . . is really no education at all" and produces
"evil effects in faithlessness and indiscipline." (Pp. 149-150.) Over all, in the
face of the great difficulties which prevail in Indian society, Mr. Justice
Mukharji places reliance on the "rule of law," which the Constitution*
provides, as the greatest safeguard for the future. It should be carried out
through courts which understand the forces at work and which, if they
"do not represent the will of the people," can at least "claim to represent
their conscience."
It is a distressing aspect of the Indian constitutional system to Mr. Justice
Mukharji that the easy process of constitutional amendment which has
been provided has led to an average of approximately one amending Act
each year, in many instances consisting of numerous parts, and that several of
the provisions of these Acts have overturned court decisions holding statutes
to be unconstitutional. Especially objectionable, in this view, is the device
adopted by the First Amendment Act of 1951, whereby specific statutes
have been enumerated in a Ninth Schedule to the Constitution and protected
from holdings of invalidity. The list has twice been augmented and consists
now of 64 measures, both Union and state. It ought to be beyond the power
of the Parliament, "under the cover or guise of a constitutional amendment"
to make "unconstitutional statutes constitutional by the mere process of
incorporating" them into a Schedule (p. 62). Subject to this amending
process, the power of the courts to determine the constitutionality of statutes
under the Indian Constitution, especially Part III containing the Fundamental Rights, is undoubted.
In contrast to Mr. Justice Mukharji, Dr. Jain blames the courts of India,
particularly the Supreme Court, for obstructive and technical decisions
1 See M. P. Jain, Indian Constitutional Law (1962), 97-102.
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invalidating essential reform measures. For him, constitutional amendments
to overcome such decisions are clearly justified. In relation to rights of
property, the power of the courts to render such decisions should be reduced
(p. 206) by the deletion of Article 19(1) (f) which in general terms confers
on citizens the right "to acquire, hold and dispose of property," subject to
"reasonable restrictions." In general, however, "there is no escape from
judicial review in a backward democracy like ours. The Courts still remain
here the bulwark of citizens' freedom, rights and honour" (p. ix).
Dr. Jain's book, a doctoral thesis in Government at Allahabad University,
is a full-length study of Article 31 of the Indian Constitution, its purposes,
the manner in which it has been applied and construed, the additions and
amendments which have been made to it, and the consequences for the
nation, especially in relation to agrarian reform. Dr. Jain points out that the
Indian Constitution protects rights which must be secured by effective
social control, as well as claims of the individual against the State (p. viii).
He writes from the standpoint of one who supports "the goal of democratic
socialism which has been the accepted ideology of the ruling party ever since
Independence" (p. vii). The first eleven chapters of his book contain a
very full, illuminating, and valuable exposition of the origin and purposes
of the property provisions of the Indian Constitution, their operation in
relation to agrarian reform legislation, the interplay among this legislation,
judicial decisions, and the process of constitutional amendment, and the
resulting state of the law. In his twelfth and final chapter Dr. Jain appraises
the current condition of Indian economic development, including agrarian
reform, without, however, relating the deficiencies which exist to difficulties
with the law. His account is informative and useful.
Dr. Jain analyzes very well at the outset the functioning of the institution
of property and the effects upon it of legal developments; and he expounds
effectively the purposes of the Constituent Assembly with relation to it. He
also exposes tellingly the processes of legal reasoning by which the courts,
from time to time, have drawn hidden meanings from otherwise plain
words of the Constitution and have found unexpected relevance in remote
clauses, with the effect of defeating legislative measures. His over-all characterization of courts and judges (p. 133) is in consequence undiscriminatingly hostile, just as is his grouping of "capitalists, . . . financiers, . . . and
landlords" with "profiteers, hoarders, blackmarketeers and other similar
social enemies" as harmful "vested interests" (p. 109). These are but exuberances of expression in an otherwise excellent analysis which does not purport
to go significantly beyond the property area.
Both Mr. Justice Mukharji and Dr. Jain discuss in brief appendices a
cataclysmic event in Indian constitutional history, which took place on
February 27, 1967, when the Supreme Court decided the case of Golak
Nath v. State of Punjab,2 to which Dr. Sathe's brief but thoughtful monograph is devoted. In that case a full bench of the Court decided 6-to-5 that
the Fundamental Rights provisions of the Constitution of India may not
be amended by any of the processes of Article 368, which provides for
Amendments, in a manner that would "take away or abridge" these Rights.
2 1967 2 S.Ct.J. 486, A.I.R. 1967 S.Ct. 1643.
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Building on the method of "prospective overruling" recently applied in
some constitutional matters by the Supreme Court of the United States,' the
Court held, however, that because of prior decisions which had sanctioned
amendments without limitation, none of the 17 Amendments previously

adopted might be questioned on this account in relation to either their
past or their future effect. Specifically saved by the decision were Amendments validating certain land reform legislation involved in the case, including Ninth Schedule listings. Thus by a strategy reminiscent of that of the
Marshall Court in this country and at least equal in "activism" to anything
attempted by the present Supreme Court of the United States, the majority
of the Indian Court imposed on the future, so long as its decision holds,
a constitutional regime in which the Court, rather than the Parliament,
will have the last word with respect to additional Amendments that are
alleged to impair any of the Fundamental Rights. Amendments designed to
overcome prior decisions holding statutes unconstitutional may be expected
to undergo particularly close scrutiny.
None of our three authors approves of this decision. Its strained logic
raises to new heights the method of causing seemingly plain constitutional
provisions to mean something different from what they appear to say;
and it is not acceptable. The threat of rigid limitation of governmental
power to enact and administer social legislation, which the' decision raises,
is not consistent with democracy. These disadvantages are a higher price
than Mr. Justice Mukharji is willing to pay for increased constitutional
stability-if, indeed, greater stability can result. To Dr. Jain, needless to
say, the decision of the majority of the Court is an unjustified and harmful
usurpation. Dr. Sathe in the second and third chapters of his book offers
telling criticisms of several aspects of the Court's reasoning in relation to the
principal point decided, as well as of the use made of "prospective overruling." Reasoning from the result, as one must in relation to the future, he
goes on to consider how the Court in judging new Amendments which
might restrict the Fundamental Rights, as well as in determining the validity
of statutes, can contribute to constitutional development instead of imposing
rigid limits.
In the Indian Constitution, with its numerous provisions, the Fundamental
Rights should be recognized as falling into two categories, according to
Dr. Sathe. The first category involves detailed and specific Rights, such as
some of the Articles specify. Others are more "transcendental," not in a
natural-law sense but in the sense of expressing the truly fundamental
ideals of individual freedom, equality, and secularism, which the framers
of the Constitution wrote into the document. Some of these underlie other
provisions than those in Title I1, which insure individual participation in
democratic processes, but could perhaps be read into certain Title III provisions, as equality of representation has been read into the equal-protectionof-the-laws clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States

Constitution. In any event the Supreme Court of India can, if it will,
amplify and safeguard these fundamental ideals in its future constitutional
decisions, adapting the basic rights to changing circumstances as the
1Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
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Supreme Court of the United States has done. Adoption of this philosophy
in the past might have avoided some of the decisions, protective of rights
of property, which it became necessary to overcome by constitutional amendment; adherence to it now becomes imperative when attempts at change.
in the Constitution itself are to be judged. The Court's "more policy oriented
approach" in the Golak Nath opinions, emphasizing consequences as well
as constitutional wording, gives ground for hope on this score, in Dr. Sathe's
opinion (p. 60). If this hope is borne out, both current fears of constitutional
rigidity and the practice of resorting to frequent Amendments for the

purpose of overcoming court decisions may be obviated.
Among the voluminous writings of Indian authors on the constitutional
law of that country. many are confined to textual analysis and exposition.
The three books under review rise far above that level. They express sturdy

judgments, grounded in study and thought, with continuous attention
to ends to be served. Their orientation is indigenous at the same time as

they draw liberally on knowledge of foreign systems to an extent which is
surely one of the most admirable characteristics of Indian constitutional

scholarship. The influence of a growing volume of this kind of writing could
contribute immeasurably to Indian development.

LEs

SOURCES Du DROIT DANS LE SYSTEME TRADITIONNEL DE L'INDE.

By R.

Lingat. Paris; La Haye: Mouton, 1957. Pp. 322.

Reviewed by John N. Hazard*
The impact of conquerors upon India's traditional system of public order
has stimulated Robert Lingat to conclude his exposition of Hindu law with
a thesis deserving the attention of comparatists concerned with the consequences of the destruction of traditional social restraints in the process of
modernization. The Islamic Emperors brought to an end the royal power
that had made the divinely defined "duties" of the Hindu system function
under a King who combined both religious and temporal authority. In
consequence, the supreme power of India was metamorphosed and lost the
influence of the traditional restraints upon the exercise of power which had
been inherent in the prescriptions of the scriptures. Islamic Emperors
could be arbitrary with Hindu subjects.
The change brought about a sharp difference also in the impact of traditional restraints upon the masses, for only the Brahmins were left to
remind them of the social order to which they should adhere, and even
these learned masters became a relatively weak force under Moslem domination, for they were deprived of their privileges and predominant position.
Consequently the masses forgot, or almost so, that their social order rested
traditionally upon reverence for duties performed out of a sense of religious
desire rather than compulsion by temporal power. The result was catastrophic
for a traditional social order based on conscience and inner restraint.
* Member of the Board of Editors.

